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The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent 
Sara B. Hobolt 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
The outcome of the British referendum on EU membership sent shockwaves through 
Europe.  While Britain is an outlier when it comes to the strength of Euroscepticism, the anti-
immigration and anti-establishment sentiments that produced the referendum outcome are 
gaining strength across Europe. Analysing campaign and survey data, this article shows that 
the divide between winners and losers of globalization was a key driver of the vote. 
Favouring British EU exit, or ‘Brexit’, was particularly common among less educated, poorer 
and older voters, and those who expressed concerns about immigration and multi-
culturalism. While there is no evidence of a short-term contagion effect with similar 
membership referendums in other countries, the Brexit vote nonetheless poses a serious 
challenge to the political establishment across Europe. 
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There was a sense of shock and disbelief in the early morning hours of 24 June 2016 both in 
Britain and across European capitals when it became clear that a small majority (51.9 per 
cent) of British voters had cast their ballot in favour of leaving the European Union (EU). 
Markets reacted quickly to the Brexit vote: the British pound plummeted to a 31-year low 
against the dollar and over 2 trillion US dollars were wiped off shares globally. The political 
ramifications were almost as immediate and dramatic, as the British Prime Minister David 
Cameron resigned, the main opposition Labour Party fought a bruising internal leadership 
battle, and the Scottish First Minister signalled Brexit could mean the break-up of the United 
Kingdom. Even the leaders of Leave camp seemed surprised by the outcome as they 
admitted they had no plan for what ‘Brexit’ would look like. Meanwhile leaders of other EU 
member states called for Britain to invoke Article 50 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty so that exit 
negotiations could begin immediately. 
In many ways, however, the outcome of the UK’s referendum on EU membership 
was not surprising. First, the British public has consistently been the most Eurosceptic 
electorate in the EU ever since the UK joined in 1973, and opinion polls had suggested that 
this referendum would be a very close race.  Second, in stark contrast to the pro-EU position 
held by most other EU governments, leading figures in Britain’s governing Conservative 
Party are fiercely opposed to the EU, thus bringing the Eurosceptic message into the 
mainstream (De Vries and Edwards 2009). Thirdly, it is well-established that referendums 
on European integration are highly unpredictable, and that voters often reject the proposals 
put to them by the government, even when supported by a consensus among mainstream 
political parties and experts (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1994, 1995; Hobolt 2009). Finally, the 
populist anti-establishment message that made the Brexit Leave campaign so effective has 
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also led to electoral successes across Europe in recent years, generally fuelled by worries 
about immigration, lack of economic opportunities and anger with the political class (Kriesi 
et al. 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). 
Hence, on the one hand the outcome of the Brexit referendum is a unique event, 
since no other member state1 has ever decided to exit the European Union. Yet, on the other 
hand the sentiments that led to this outcome are by no means a distinctively British 
phenomenon. The analyses presented in this article show that British Leave voters were 
motivated by anti-immigration and anti-establishment feelings. They also reveal stark 
demographic divides, as the less well-educated and the less well-off voted in large majorities 
to leave the EU, while the young graduates in the urban centres voted to stay. This divide 
between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalization and mass immigration and 
those who see it as a welcome opportunity is also a driving force behind the increasing 
support for Eurosceptic parties on the radical right and left across Europe (see Kriesi et al. 
2012; Teney et al. 2014). Concerns about the cultural and economic threats of globalization, 
immigration and European integration are effectively mobilized by parties, especially on the 
populist right, that have been gaining ground in national and European elections (see 
Hobolt and De Vries 2015, 2016b; Van Elsas et al. 2016). The challenge that the EU faces thus 
go beyond the loss of a major member state, and the economic and political ramification that 
follows from that. Perhaps more significant is the fact that many voters across Europe see 
                                                          
1 There is one precedent to the Brexit vote. In 1982, Greenland, part of Denmark, voted by 52 per cent 
to secede from the EEC, but Denmark remained within the EEC. That referendum had limited 
consequences for the EU as a whole given Greenland’s small population and its relationship to 
Denmark. 
4 
 
the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution when it comes to protecting ordinary 
citizens from the challenges of an ever more globalized and integrated world.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the background of the British EU 
referendum and describes the campaign leading up to the vote. Second, the article presents 
an analysis of voting and survey data to explain the main divisions in the British electorate 
and the attitudes that explain support for Brexit. Finally, I consider some of the implications 
for European politics, with a particular focus on the likelihood of a domino effect with other 
EU membership referendums across Europe and the electoral successes of Eurosceptic 
parties. 
 
The Brexit referendum campaign 
The Brexit referendum came about as the culmination of decades of internal division in the 
British Conservative Party on the issue of European integration. To appease the Eurosceptic 
wing of the party and to avoid a flight of voters to the populist right-wing United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP),  the 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto included a pledge of a 
‘straight in-out referendum of the European Union by the end of 2017’ (Conservative Party 
Manifesto 2015: 32). Hence, as with many other EU referendums, this referendum was called 
for domestic party political and electoral reasons (Prosser 2016). After the Conservative 
Party won an outright majority in the May 2015 General Election, Cameron set out to 
negotiate a ‘new settlement’ for Britain in Europe, promising to win a host of concessions 
from Brussels.  On 20 February 2016, Cameron finalized that deal with 27 other European 
leaders and set the June date for the EU membership referendum. The deal included the 
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power to limit EU migrants’ in-work benefits, a treaty change so the UK would not be 
bound by ‘ever closer union’, and the ability for the UK to enact ‘an emergency safeguard’ to 
protect the interests of the City of London and British businesses (Jensen and Snaith 2016). 
Yet, this much-heralded ‘new settlement’ was widely derided by the British press for 
amounting to very little, and the announcement of the deal even led to a boost for the Leave 
side in the polls (YouGov 2016). The deal subsequently played a very minor role in the 
referendum campaign. 
Despite the failure to win over voters with a new settlement for Britain in the EU, the 
government nonetheless felt confident that it could win the referendum. All the major 
parties in Parliament were in favour of remaining in the EU, including the major opposition 
party, Labour. The Remain side also had the major business interests and trade unions on its 
side as well as most foreign leaders and international organisations. The governing 
Conservative Party itself, however, was openly divided in the campaign with several cabinet 
members, including the charismatic former mayor of London (and now Foreign Secretary) 
Boris Johnson campaigning to leave the EU. The newspapers were split when it came to 
recommending an In or Out vote. A media study of the campaign by Loughborough 
University shows that Conservative politicians dominated media coverage on both sides of 
the campaign, accounting for almost two-thirds of all referendum-related media 
appearances, with David Cameron the most prominent In-campaigner (mentioned in 25 per 
cent of news items) and Boris Johnson the most prominent Out-campaigner (mentioned in 
19 per cent of news items). In contrast, the Labour Party led a more lacklustre campaign (its 
leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was only mentioned in 6 per cent of news items) (see Loughborough 
University 2016).  The “poll of polls”, shown in Figure 1, reveals a very close race with slight 
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lead for the Remain-side during most of the campaign, but with some fluctuation in the last 
month of the campaign where several polls indicated a Leave majority. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
There were two official campaign organisations, ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ and 
‘Vote Leave’2. From the outset of the campaign, the battle lines were starkly drawn up by the 
two sides: the economy versus immigration. The messages were clear: vote Remain to avoid 
the economic risk of a Brexit (‘A leap in the dark’) or vote Leave to regain control of British 
borders, British law-making and restrict immigration (‘Take back control’).  On both sides, 
the campaign rhetoric was largely negative with the In-camp focusing on the threat of 
economic disaster in the case of Brexit vote (dubbed ‘Project Fear’ by the Leave camp) and 
the Out-campaign mobilizing people’s fears of immigration (referred to as ‘Project Hate’ by 
the Remain camp). The Remain-side was hopeful that the economic uncertainties associated 
with Brexit would ultimately persuade voters to choose the status quo option, since there 
was an overwhelming consensus among experts that a Brexit outcome would have negative 
economic consequences for Britain. In contrast, the Leave camp presented the referendum as 
a unique opportunity to regain control of British law-making, borders and restrict 
immigration. The media analysis of the campaign reveal that both camps were successful in 
setting the agenda, since the economy and immigration clearly dominated the news 
coverage.  In the first three weeks of the campaign economic issues received considerably 
more attention than immigration to the benefit of the Remain camp. There was, however, a 
shift towards immigration as the dominant issue in the latter weeks of the campaign, which 
                                                          
2 There were also other campaigning groups notably on the Leave side, such Leave.EU and Grassroots 
Out with clear anti-immigration and anti-establishment messages. 
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may have benefitted the Leave campaign (Loughborough University 2016). Interestingly 
other issues, such as sovereignty, security, democracy and devolution were much more 
marginal issues in the media coverage of the referendums.  
This picture of a simple choice between the economy and immigration is also 
reinforced by survey evidence. According to one YouGov poll, 84 per cent of Leave voters 
thought that there would be ‘less immigration into Britain’ if we left the EU, compared to 
only 27 per cent of Remain voters. The same survey asked about whether Britain would be 
worse or better off economically following Brexit, and only 4 per cent of Leave voters 
thought Britain would be worse off, despite a broad consensus among experts that this 
would indeed be the case.  In contrast, 78 per cent of ‘remainers’ thought Britain would be 
worse off economically (YouGov 20-22 June 2016).  To explore voters’ reasoning further, I 
designed a survey where a representative sample of over 5,000 British citizens were asked to 
think about the arguments they have personally heard during the referendum campaign and 
summarize the main argument in their own words. When analysing these thousands of 
open-ended responses, I find that immigration and the economy emerge as the main 
arguments.  The analysis identifies around nine distinct arguments mentioned by voters that 
centre on immigration, sovereignty, the economy, lack of information, and distrust in the 
government, as summarizes in Figure 2.  Similar to the media analysis I find that a number 
of other issues often central to the debate on European integration, notably democracy and 
environmental protection, do not appear as prominent arguments for or against 
membership in the minds of voters in this referendum debate.  
The British public was clearly sharply divided in what it considers to be the main 
issue of the referendum. As Figure 2 shows, the two key arguments that resonate more with 
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Remain voters than with Leave voters relate to the economy, specifically the loss of security 
and economic stability in the event of Brexit and the economic benefits of EU membership, 
while Leave voters highlight mainly concerns about immigration as expressed by one 
respondent: ‘Immigrants flooding into the country if we don’t regain control of our own 
borders’.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Another key argument for Leave voters is lack of trust in David Cameron and his 
government. Hence, the Leave-side successfully mobilized not only salient concerns about 
immigration but also anti-establishment attitudes, portraying the vote as a chance for 
ordinary citizens to ‘take back control’ from the elites in Brussels. The analysis of vote choice 
below shows that such anti-elite sentiments appealed to many Leave voters.   
 
Explaining the Brexit Vote 
While the Brexit referendum was only the second membership referendum in an existing 
member state (the first being the British EEC referendum in 1975, where 67 per cent voted to 
remain), there have been over 50 referendums on other aspects of European integration, 
mainly accession and treaty ratification (Hobolt 2009). Consequently, there is a large 
literature on how voters decide in such referendums. Much of the scholarly debate has 
focused on whether voters decide on the basis of their attitudes towards the EU (the issue-
voting approach) or whether they use the referendum to express their dissatisfaction with 
the government (the second-order approach). The first approach focuses on individuals’ 
values and beliefs and argues that voting behaviour in EU referendums reflects people’s 
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underlying, broad attitudes towards European integration (Siune et al. 1994; Garry et al. 
2005). The alternative explanation of voting behaviour in EU referendums is inspired by the 
‘second-order’ theory of elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980) where voters are thus expected to 
use their vote as a means of signalling their dissatisfaction with the government, or the 
domestic political class more generally (Franklin et al. 1994, 1995). Other work on 
referendums has argued that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, but that that the 
nature of the referendum campaigns influences how voters decide. For example, Hug (2002) 
argues that punishment strategies (second-order voting) are more likely to occur when 
governments employ referendums in an attempt to shore up support and when the outcome 
is legally non-binding. Other studies have examined how the salience of the issue of 
European integration affects attitudes and reception of elite cues and, in turn, influences 
patterns of voting behaviour in referendums (see Franklin 2002; Hobolt 2009). When salience 
is high, and voters have a greater interest in European affairs, they are more likely to rely on 
their attitudes towards European integration and less likely to treat the referendum as a 
‘second-order election’.  
As the Brexit referendum was clearly a high salience referendum with a long and 
intense campaign and high turnout (72.2 per cent), we would expect that issue-specific 
attitudes (Euroscepticism) to matter, but importantly we also want to examine where such 
opinions originate from. The literature on Euroscepticism outlines three main approaches to 
explaining variation in support for, and opposition to, European integration: ‘utilitarian’, 
‘identity’, and ‘cue-taking’ approaches (see Hobolt and de Vries 2016a). The basic 
proposition of the utilitarian approach is that since European trade liberalization favours 
citizens with higher levels of human capital (education and occupational skills) and income, 
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such individuals will be more supportive of European integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995; 
Gabel 1998; Tucker et al. 2002).  Moreover, a growing literature has shown that a divide has 
emerged between the so-called winners and losers of globalization and that these groups 
have coherent and distinct attitudinal positions towards issues such as international 
cooperation, European integration and immigration (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; Azmanova 2011; 
Teney et al. 2014). In a nutshell, the ‘winners’ of globalization – the young, well-educated 
professionals in urban centres - favour more open borders, immigration and international 
cooperation whereas the ‘left behind’ - the working class, less educated, and the older - 
oppose such openness. There is consistent evidence to suggest that socio-economic factors 
shape attitudes towards European integration, and recent work even reveals that education 
has become a more important determinant of EU support over time, as the less educated are 
becoming less supportive of the integration project (Hakhverdian et al. 2013). Similarly, in 
the Brexit referendum I would expect that those who are less educated would hold more 
Eurosceptic and anti-immigration attitudes and be more likely to vote to Leave.   
Demographics may tell part of the story about Euroscepticism, but more deep-seated 
attachments have also been found to drive such attitudes. Scholars have argued that 
European integration is not only, or even primarily, about trade and the single market, but 
also about a pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination and 
blurs boundaries between distinct national communities (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 
2005, 2009; McLaren 2006). Not surprisingly therefore individuals' attachment to their nation 
and their perceptions of people from other cultures influence their attitudes towards 
European integration. Carey (2002) has shown that people with strong national identity are 
less supportive of European integration. There is also evidence in studies by McLaren (2002, 
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2006) and others that Euroscepticism is closely related to a general hostility towards other 
cultures, such as negative attitudes towards minority groups and immigrants (De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 2005; Hobolt et al. 2011). Hooghe and Marks (2005) have demonstrated 
that individuals who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial 
identities are likely to be considerably more Eurosceptic than those who have multiple 
nested identities.  Hence, my expectation is that strong national identity, especially English 
identity, to be associated with the Leave vote, while voters with a European identity would 
be much more likely to vote to remain in the EU. 
Yet, as we know from the second-order election literature on referendum behaviour, 
vote choices are not always driven identities or attitudes towards the issues at stake, but also 
by feelings about the political establishment more generally and the government in 
particular.  The literature on Euroscepticism has also shown that citizens rely on ‘cues’ and 
proxies when forming opinions about the EU (Anderson 1998). Since citizens generally pay 
more attention to the national political arena than European politics it makes sense that they 
employ domestic cues to form opinions about European integration. The recommendations 
provided by national political parties are crucial cues (Lupia 1992; Hobolt 2007).  These are 
also likely to have mattered in the Brexit referendum, especially when the parties were 
united in their position on the referendum. As already discussed, the governing 
Conservative party was openly divided during the campaign, and cue-taking could thus 
have worked in both directions. Yet, attitudes toward the political elite may also play a very 
different role in referendums as voters can use the ballot to punish the political 
establishment. Indeed, the Leave campaign sought to frame the referendum as a battle 
between ordinary people and the political establishment in line with the populist idea of a 
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fundamental division between the ‘the pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2007). 
Hence, I would also expect that the Brexit vote was, at least in part, driven by such ‘populist 
attitudes’ and a general disaffection with the political class. 
 
Analysis of vote choice 
To summarize the discussion above, I expect that four sets of factors shaped vote choices: 
socio-economic factors, geographical identities, feelings about the domestic political 
establishment and, finally, policy attitudes. These factors are of course highly interrelated. 
Following the Michigan model of voting behaviour (Campbell et al. 1960), we can think of 
these predictors as a ‘funnel of causality’ where socio-demographic factors and identities are 
causally prior to, and shape, political attitudes that in turn are the proximal cause of vote 
choice. Hence, each of these models are estimated separately to test their association with 
the vote choice, but the analysis here does not allow us to disentangle the complex causal 
mechanisms that link these factors together. 
To test each of the explanatory approaches I analyse the rich data contained in 7th 
Wave of the British Election Study. This wave constitutes the pre-campaign ‘Panel Survey 
Study of the 2016 EU Referendum’, conducted prior to the referendum.3 The dependent 
variable is thus Leave vote intention in the referendum, where respondents were asked: ‘If 
there was a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union tomorrow, how do 
you think you would vote?’.  There is very considerable stability in the predictors of vote 
                                                          
3. Wave 7 was conducted online by the survey organization YouGov between 14th April 2016 and 4th 
May 2016. 
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intention and actual vote choice. The advantage of this particular dataset is not only the 
impressive sample size (30,895 respondents), but also the number of variables included in 
the questionnaire that allows us to investigate all of the hypothesized factors. 
Starting with the utilitarian model that focuses on how an individual’s socio-
demographic position influences her attitudes towards the EU, and in turn, vote choice, we 
examine the impact of level of education, household income, and age. The model also 
includes individual perceptions of changes in personal economic conditions in this model.4  
The second model is the identity model, also discussed above. This includes measures of 
European identity as well as the strength of British and English identity.5 The expectation is 
that people who feel strongly European would be more likely to remain in the European 
Union. In contrast, a stronger national identity is expected to be associated with the Leave 
vote.  
The third model focuses on how people’s attitude towards the domestic political 
class can shape referendum outcomes. Following the second-order election approach, the 
expectation is that attitudes towards domestic political elite matter. However, this can lead 
to two contrasting expectations: cue-taking and punishment. On the one hand, we know that 
people take cues from their preferred party when forming opinions on complex issues such 
as EU membership. Hence, the model includes a variable that indicates which party the 
                                                          
4 The respondents were asked: “How does the financial situation of your household now compare 
with what it was 12 months ago? 
5 Respondents were asked to place themselves on 7-point scales in terms of the strength of their 
“Europeanesss”, “Britishness” and “Englishness”. 
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respondents would vote.6 The expectation is that if a party recommends a Remain vote, 
voters who feel close to this party would be more likely to also vote Remain, and vice versa 
for Leave. However, as already mentioned, the parties were not all united in their approach. 
The Conservative Party in particular was internally divided, the Labour Party less so, while 
the Liberal Democrats were united for Remain and UKIP united in their opposition to 
membership. On the other hand, voters may also use referendums as an opportunity to 
punish the political establishment and vote against the status quo. I therefore include a scale 
of items that captures an individuals’ agreement with this populist message7 as well as their 
general distrust in politicians8 and their (dis)approval of the government’s performance.9 
 The final model is the classic issue-voting model that assumes that voters base their 
choices on relevant policy preferences. The model thus includes a number of items that 
capture attitudes towards salient issues discussed by each camp in the campaign including 
EU immigration (should more or fewer be allowed to come to Britain?), parliamentary 
sovereignty (should the UK Parliament override EU laws?), trade with Europe (good or bad 
for Britain?), and views on whether the EU has made Britain more prosperous, undermined 
                                                          
6 And if there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? 
7 The cumulative scale (with an alpha scalability score of 0.84) consists of responses to the following 5 
items: “The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people”; “The people, and 
not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions”;  “I would rather be represented by 
a citizen than by a specialized politician”; “Elected officials talk too much and take too little action”; 
and “What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles” 
8 “How much trust do you have in Members of Parliament in general?” 
9 Do you approve or disapprove of the job that each of the UK government is doing? 
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Britain’s distinctive identity, and helped prevent wars. Given that so much of the debate was 
focused on what would happen in the event of Brexit, the model also includes variables 
capturing the respondents’ assessments of whether Brexit will lead to more or less trade and 
more or less immigration. The results are shown in a series of logistic regression models in 
Table 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 1 in Table 1 lends support to the utilitarian model of support for the EU. In 
line with our expectation I find that those who have benefitted from increased international 
cooperation and trade – the better educated, the young and the well-off – are less likely to 
vote for Leave compared to those who are ‘left behind’ – the low-skilled, the old and the 
poor. Simple descriptive statistics reveals a clear educational divide in the Brexit vote. Figure 
3 shows that that only a quarter of people with a postgraduate degree voted to leave, 
whereas over two-thirds of those with no qualifications did so. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
This impact of education on vote choices is also highly significant in the multiple 
logistic regression models. As log odds are not straightforward to interpret, the last column 
in Table 1 shows the marginal effect of one standard deviation change in each of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of voting Leave. This shows the strongest effect for 
education and age.  Going from A-level education to an undergraduate degree reduces the 
probability of voting Leave by about 10 percentage points, all other things being equal. 
Similarly, a 50 year old is 10 percentage points more likely to support Brexit compared to a 
33 year old vote. Men are slightly more likely to vote Leave (2 percentage points), as are 
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those with lower incomes and those who feel that their financial situation has deteriorated. 
These are very substantial differences, especially when it comes to the generation and 
education gaps, however the overall model fit is modest (pseudo R-squared of 0.09). 
 The model fit is much improved when the subjective assessments of identity are 
included in Model 2 (pseudo R-squared of 0.34). Unsurprisingly, European identity in 
particular is a powerful predictor of the Remain vote. A standard deviation increase in 
“Europeaness” reduces the probability of voting Leave by as much as 37 percentage points. 
In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in English identity increases the likelihood 
of voting Leave by 10 percentage points and 5 percentage points for British identity. It 
makes sense that we find a greater effect for English national identity compared to the more 
‘inclusive’ British identity, since English nationalism is often associated with the defence of 
national sovereignty in opposition to transfers of powers both upwards (to the EU) and 
downwards (to devolved nations) (see Wellings 2012). Overall, the results show that deep-
seated identities matter when it comes to vote choice. But what about attitudes towards the 
political class?  
Model 3 demonstrates that parties matter, but not necessarily as expected. While the 
Conservative-led government advocated Remain, Conservative supporters are 12 
percentage points more likely to vote for Brexit compared to people without a preferred 
party. Labour voters were more in favour of Remain (25 percentage points), while we find 
no statistically significant effect for Liberal Democrats supporters. The largest effect is found 
among UKIP supporters who were 88 percentage points more likely to be Brexiteers – 
unsurprising given that opposition to EU membership is the main policy goal of the party. 
Supporters of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Welsh Plaid Cymru are more likely 
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to be Remainers. So, party cues matter, especially when they are united in the cause. But for 
many voters, this referendum was also an opportunity to vote against the political class in its 
entirety. There is a strong impact of lack of trust in politicians on the Leave vote: one 
standard deviation increase in distrust leads to a 9 percentage point increase in the 
probability of a Leave vote. Similarly, a standard deviation change in populist attitudes 
leads to a 4 percentage point change in the Leave likelihood. Interestingly, however, 
disapproval of the performance of the government has no effect on the Leave vote, at least 
not when controlling for preferred party. So the Brexit vote cannot be interpreted as a 
straightforward punishment of the Cameron government. Overall, this anti-establishment 
and cue-taking model explains about as much variance as the identity model. 
 Finally, turning to the attitudes model we see even greater explanatory power, as we 
would expect since EU issue attitudes should be the most proximal cause of vote choice in 
such a high intensity referendum campaign (Hobolt 2009).  As anticipated, the results show 
that the issues mobilized in the campaign – the EU’s effect on the economy and immigration 
– are highly correlated with vote choice.  Both economic perceptions and cultural concerns 
had a substantial impact on vote choices. Those who felt that the EU had undermined the 
distinct identity of Britain were much more likely to vote to leave, whereas the view that the 
EU had made Britain more prosperous had a similarly sizeable effect. Attitudes towards 
immigration also mattered: individuals who thought Britain should have many fewer EU 
migrants were 32 percentage points more likely to vote for Brexit compared to those who 
wanted more migrants. Equally, expectations about the consequences of Brexit had very 
significant effects. Voters convinced by the argument that Brexit would reduce trade and 
employment were much more likely to vote to remain compared to those who were not 
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convinced about the negative impact on the economy. Similarly anticipation about changes 
to immigration post-Brexit mattered to voters (although the effect size is about half). 
In sum, the analysis shows that EU issue attitudes were mobilized during this 
referendum campaign and helped to shape vote choices. Traditional concerns about 
sovereignty and the economic benefits of membership were important, but equally salient 
were identity concerns related to the impact of immigration and European integration on 
Britain’s cultural identity. Are such concerns unique to Britain or can we expect similar 
revolts against the pro-EU elites in other member states? 
 
Is Britain an outlier? 
One of the primary concerns in European capitals following the British referendum was the 
risk of contagion. While the EU may well be able to survive the exit of Britain - always a 
recalcitrant member state - the worry was that this could trigger a domino effect with 
referendums in other countries. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, several leaders of 
populist Eurosceptic parties called for their own EU membership referendums, including in 
France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Sweden. However, unlike in Britain where 
the governing Conservative party called a referendum due to internal divisions on the issue, 
most mainstream parties in Western Europe are staunchly pro-EU.  Even the most successful 
Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe, such as the Danish People’s Party and the Dutch and 
Austrian Freedom parties, would need to form a coalition with pro-EU parties in order gain 
office, and they would find it hard to muster a parliamentary majority to call a referendum 
on EU membership. This makes membership referendums less likely in other countries, 
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although far from impossible given pressure from insurgent populist right-wing parties. But 
even if the Eurosceptic right succeeds in their calls for more membership referendums, it is 
far from certain that the outcome would be another exit. Despite growing Euroscepticism is 
the wake of the Eurozone and migrant crises, opinion polls have consistently shown that 
Britain is an outlier when it comes to support for leaving the European Union. Figure 4 
shows the ‘Remain in’-lead in response to the question ‘If there was a referendum on your 
country’s membership on the European Union, how would you vote?’ since 2012.  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
It clearly shows that the UK is the only one of the member states surveyed where there has 
been public support for leaving the EU for most of the period since 2012. In contrast, the net 
gap between those wanting to stay in and those wanting to leave the EU is well above 20 
percentage points in favour of staying in both Germany and Denmark, and also above 10 
percentage points in France and Finland, with greater fluctuation in support in Sweden. 
Yet, that is not to say that the Brexit vote represents a uniquely British phenomenon. 
Indeed, it can be argued that it reflects the same sentiments that drive increases in support 
for populist Eurosceptic parties across Europe in recent years, especially in the aftermath of 
the Eurozone crisis. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, such parties won around 30 
per cent of the seats (Treib 2015; Hobolt and De Vries 2016b). In national elections populist 
right-wing parties opposed to the EU, such as Geert Wilders’ far-right Freedom Party, the 
Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party and the Sweden Democrats, have gained electoral 
support in the recent decade (Hobolt and Tilley 2016). These challenger parties also 
effectively use populist rhetoric that pits ‘ordinary people’ against the political 
establishment. Recent studies have shown that the rise in support for these challenger 
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parties reflect similar divides to those identified in the Brexit campaign with higher levels of 
support for Eurosceptic parties among the less educated, people adversely affected by the 
Eurozone crisis, and among those who oppose immigration and multiculturalism (see 
Hobolt and De Vries 2016b; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). There is a growing divide, both 
economically and culturally, between those who feel left behind by the forces of 
globalization and those who feel they have benefitted from it. The former group favours a 
‘drawbridge up’ policy of less European integration, closed borders and fewer migrants, 
whereas the latter group are in favour of greater openness and international cooperation. 
The Eurozone crisis and the Mediterranean migrant crisis have only served to deepen these 
divides.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, referendums on European integration 
have often had elite-defying consequences. Yet the Brexit referendum is arguable the most 
significant in the EU’s history. The exit of a member state from the EU is unprecedented and 
the political and economic consequences are likely to be considerable and prolonged, not 
only for Britain but for the EU as a whole. It is convenient to see the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum as yet another example of British exceptionalism. After all, Britain has always 
been a reluctant partner standing on the side lines of the European project. As the French 
President De Gaulle noted as early as 1963: ‘England is in effect insular […] She has, in all 
her doings, very marked and very original habits and traditions.’  
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But this referendum cannot be dismissed as just a sign of English insularity. Whereas 
public and party political Euroscepticism is more pronounced in Britain than in the rest of 
the EU, the sentiments that led a majority of voters to opt for Brexit are gaining strength 
across the continent. Concerns about immigration and the loss of a distinct national identity 
were important to many who favoured Brexit, and they were issues that clearly divided the 
Leave and Remain camps. Such fears of immigration and multiculturalism are more 
pronounced among voters with lower levels of education and in a more vulnerable position 
in the labour market. Such voters also voted most decisively for Leave, whereas the 
‘winners’ of globalization – the younger and highly educated professionals – were 
overwhelmingly in favour of Remain. The results of the Brexit referendum portray a deeply 
divided country, not only along class, education and generational lines, but also in terms of 
geography. Generally the Remain side did better in the larger multicultural cities (especially 
in London) and where there were more graduates, whereas the Leave side was strongest in 
the English countryside and in the post-industrial Northeastern towns with larger working 
class populations. It also divided the nations of the UK: while both England and Wales 
voted 53 per cent Leave, Northern Ireland and Scotland voted Remain (at 56 and 62 per cent 
respectively).  
Across Europe we find similar divisions between the so-called winners of 
globalization and those who feel left behind. While the former tend to embrace European 
integration and multiculturalism, the latter feel threatened by the changes that globalization 
and European integration have brought about. Such divisions have been successfully 
mobilized by populist parties across Europe, especially on the right, who give a voice to the 
fears of ‘ordinary, decent people’ in opposition to a political establishment that has often 
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failed to listen. We see this expressed not only in referendums, but also in the electoral 
successes of populist Eurosceptic parties, such as Front National in France, the Freedom 
Party in the Netherlands, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark and the Freedom Party in 
Austria. While the British experience may make membership referendums less likely in 
other EU countries as it has starkly illustrated the risks associated with such plebiscites, the 
rise of populist Eurosceptic parties nonetheless presents a significant challenge to the EU. 
Gone are the days when elites could pursue European integration with no regard to public 
opinion. There has been a move away from the ‘permissive consensus’ of the early period of 
integration towards a period where the EU is an increasingly contested and politicized issue 
in the domestic political arena. The future of the EU hinges more than ever on citizens’ 
support for the European integration project. The challenge for European leaders, both 
domestically and at the European level, is to find a way of addressing the concerns of the 
many citizens who have not felt the economic benefits for free trade and globalization, and 
who feel that the distinct national identity and culture is under threat from immigration and 
European integration. 
  
23 
 
Notes on contributor 
Sara B. Hobolt is the Sutherland Chair in European Institutions and a professor at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. She is Vice-Chair of the European 
Election Studies. Her book Europe in Question. Referendums on European Integration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) was awarded the Best Book prize by EUSA in 2010. 
 
Address for correspondence 
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton 
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: s.b.hobolt@lse.ac.uk 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Christopher Wratil for assistance with the design and analysis of the 
Brexit referendum survey and the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust (SG153370) for financial 
support. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers and the editors of JEPP for 
valuable comments. 
 
  
24 
 
References 
Anderson, C.J. (1998) ‘When in Doubt Use Proxies: Attitudes to Domestic Politics and 
Support for the EU’, Comparative Political Studies, 31: 569–601. 
Azmanova, A. (2011) ‘After the left–right (dis)continuum: globalization and the remaking of 
Europe’s ideological geography’, International Political Sociology 5(4): 384–407. 
Carey, S. (2002) ‘Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European 
integration?’ European Union Politics 3(4): 387–413. 
Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 (2015) URL: 
https://www.conservatives.com/yourmanifesto  
De Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2005) ‘Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of 
Immigration and Support for European Integration’, European Union Politics, 6(1): 59–82 
De Vries, C.E. and Edwards, E. (2009) ‘Taking Europe to Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and 
Public Euroskepticism’, Party Politics 15(1): 5-28. 
Evans, G. and Mellon, J. (2016) ‘How immigration became a Eurosceptic issue’. LSE Europp 
blog: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/01/05/how-immigration-became-a-eurosceptic-
issue/ 
Franklin, M. (2002) ‘Learning from the Danish case: a comment on Palle Svensson’s critique 
of the Franklin thesis’, European Journal of Political Research 41: 751–7. 
25 
 
Franklin, M., Marsh, M. and McLaren, L. (1994) ‘Uncorking the bottle: popular opposition to 
European unification in the wake of Maastricht’, Journal of Common Market Studies 32(4): 455–
72  
Franklin, M., Van der Eijk, C. and Marsh, M. (1995)  ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in 
government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht’, West European Politics 
18(3): 101–117. 
Gabel, MJ. (1998). Interest and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European 
Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Gabel, MJ, and Palmer, HD (1995) ‘Understanding variation in public support for European 
integration’. European Journal of Political Research 27: 3–19. 
Garry, J., Marsh, M. and Sinnott, R. (2005) ‘Second order versus issue voting effects in EU 
referendums: evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty referendums’, European Union Politics 6(2): 
201–21. 
Hakhverdian, A., E. Van Elsas, W. Van Der Brug, and T. Kuhn (2013) ‘Euroscepticism and 
Education: A Longitudinal Study of 12 EU Member States.’ European Union Politics, 14(4): 
522-541.  
Hobolt, S.B. (2007) 'Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in 
Referendums on European Integration'. European Journal of Political Research, 46(2): 151-182.  
Hobolt, S.B. (2009) Europe in question: Referendums on European integration. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
26 
 
Hobolt, S.B. and De Vries, C.E. (2016a) ‘Public support for European integration’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 19: 413-432. 
Hobolt, S.B. and De Vries, C.E. (2016b) ‘Turning against the union? The impact of the crisis 
on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections’. Electoral Studies. 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.05.006.  
Hobolt, S.B. and De Vries, C.E. (2015) ‘Issue entrepreneurship and multiparty competition’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 48 (9): 1159-1185. 
Hobolt, SB and Tilley, J (2016) ‘Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the 
aftermath of the Euro crisis’, West European Politics, 39 (5). 971-991. 
Hobolt, S.B., Van der Brug, W., De Vreese, C.H., Boomgaarden, H.G., Hinrichsen, M.C. 
(2011) ‘Religious intolerance and Euroscepticism’, European Union Politics, 12 (3): 359-379. 
Hug, S. (2002) Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums and European Integration, Boulder, CO: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G.  (2005) ‘Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on 
European Integration’, European Union Politics, 6:4, 419–443.  
Hooghe, L and Marks, G. (2009) ‘Postfunctionalism A Postfunctionalist Theory of European 
Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 39(1): 1–23. 
Jensen, M.D. and Snaith, H. (2016) ‘When politics prevails: the political economy of a Brexit’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1174531 
27 
 
Kriesi, H, Grande, E, Dolezal, M, Helbling, M, Hoglinger, D, Hutter, S and Wuest, B (2012). 
Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Loughborough University (2016). EU Referendum 2016. Media analysis from Loughborough 
University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture. URL: 
https://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/eu-referendum/uk-news-coverage-2016-eu-referendum-report-
5-6-may-22-june-2016/ 
Lupia, A. (1992) ‘Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information’, American 
Political Science Review 86: 390–403. 
McLaren, L. (2002) ‘Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or 
Perceived Cultural Threat?’ Journal of Politics, 64(2): 551–566. 
McLaren, L. (2006) Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Prosser, Chris (2016) ’Calling European Union treaty referendums: Electoral and 
institutional politics’. Political Studies, 64(1): 182-199. 
Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) ‘Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of European election results’, European Journal of Political Research 
8(1): 3–44. 
28 
 
Siune, K., Svensson, P. and Tonsgaard, O. (1994) ‘The EU: the Danes said “no” in 1992, but 
“yes” in 1993: how and why?’, Electoral Studies 13(2): 107–16.  
Teney, C.,  Lacewell, O.P. and De Wilde, P. (2014) Winners and losers of globalization in 
Europe: attitudes and ideologies. European Political Science Review, 6(4): 575-595.  
Treib, O (2014) ‘The Voter Says No, but Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the 
Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(10), 
2014, 1541-1554 
Tucker, JA., Pacek, AC, Berinsky, AJ.(2002). ‘Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes 
toward EU membership in Post-Communist Countries’, American Journal of Political Science, 
46(3): 557–571 
 
YouGov (2016) Draft EU deal gives boost to Leave campaign. URL: 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/04/eu-referendum-leave-leads-nine/ 
 
Van Elsas, E, van der Brug, W. and Hakhverdian, A. (2016) ‘United against a common foe? 
The nature and origins of euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing voters’. West 
European Politics. DOI:10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244 
 
Wellings, B. (2012) English Nationalism and Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace. British Identities 
since 1707,  Peter Lang. 
  
29 
 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Referendum vote intention Poll of Polls 
 
Source: Poll of Polls of referendum vote intention, compiled by Prof John Curtice and NatCen Social Research, 
available at http://whatukthinks.org 
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Figure 2: Main arguments for Remain and Leave voters 
 
Source: Original poll by Sara B. Hobolt and Christopher Wratil conducted by YouGov between 9-11 May 2016. 
The figure shows the results from Structural Topic Model with k = 9 topics and demographic, socioeconomic, and 
political covariates. It depicts differences in topic proportions between Leave and Remain voters (pr(Leave) – 
pr(Remain)); estimated with “stm”-package in R. 
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Figure 3: The Education Gap 
 
Source: BES Online Panel Wave 7 
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Figure 4:  Support for EU membership across Europe  
 
Source: YouGov EuroTrack, 3-months rolling average 
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Table 1: Explaining the Brexit Vote 
  
(1) Socio-
Demographics 
(2) Identity  
(2)Anti-elite & 
cue-taking  
(4) Attitudes  Marginal effects % 
  Coef SEs Sig Coef SEs Sig Coef SEs Sig Coef SEs Sig 
One SD ∆ (One 
unit ∆  for 0/1) 
(model 
#) 
Constant 0.45 0.09 ** 0.94 0.12 ** -2.32 0.17 ** -14.99 0.26 ** 
  Gender -0.08 0.03 ** -0.24 0.03 ** 0.00 0.03 
 
-0.13 0.05 ** -2 (1) 
Age 0.02 0.00 ** 0.03 0.00 ** 0.02 0.00 ** 0.01 0.00 ** 11 (1) 
Education -0.40 0.01 ** -0.19 0.01 ** -0.30 0.01 ** -0.08 0.02 ** -13 (1) 
Income -0.04 0.01 ** -0.05 0.01 ** -0.07 0.01 ** -0.05 0.01 ** -2 (1) 
Personal econ eval (positive) -0.10 0.02 ** 
         
-2 (1) 
European identity 
   
-0.80 0.01 ** 
      
-37 (2) 
English identity 
   
0.18 0.01 ** 
      
10 (2) 
British identity 
   
0.13 0.01 ** 
      
5 (2) 
Lack of trust in politicians 
      
0.24 0.01 ** 
   
9 (3) 
Government disapproval 
      
-0.02 0.02 
    
-1 (3) 
Populist attitudes 
      
0.08 0.01 ** 
   
4 (3) 
Conservative supporter 
      
0.49 0.05 ** 
   
12 (3) 
Labour supporter 
      
-0.99 0.04 ** 
   
-25 (3) 
Lib Dem supporter 
      
0.00 0.08 
    
0 (3) 
SNP/PC supporter 
      
-0.83 0.07 ** 
   
-21 (3) 
UKIP supporter 
      
3.55 0.12 ** 
   
88 (3) 
EU has not made UK more prosperous 
         
0.93 0.04 ** 23 (4) 
EU has not helped prevent war  
         
0.55 0.03 ** 15 (4) 
Free trade bad for UK 
         
0.47 0.03 ** 8 (4) 
UK Parliament to override EU law 
         
0.42 0.03 ** 12 (4) 
EU has undermined British identity 
         
0.80 0.03 ** 24 (4) 
Anti-EU migrants 
         
0.13 0.01 ** 8 (4) 
Brexit will not reduce trade 
         
1.07 0.04 ** 24 (4) 
Brexit will lower immigration 
         
0.56 0.03 ** 13 (4) 
N 23, 914     23, 914     23, 914     23, 914         
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Pseudo R-squared 0.09     0.34     0.29     0.64         
Note:  Logistic regression models with Leave vote as dependent variable. Non-voters/Don’t knows excluded. Source: BES Online Panel Wave 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
